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Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a cost for
involved individuals has seldom been considered. The introduction of costly interactions leads, instead, to
the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to cooperate and pay the cost
in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alternatively, the same individual can decide to
free ride, without incurring any cost, waiting for others to get synchronized to his or her state. Thus, the
emergence of synchronization may be seen as the byproduct of an evolutionary game in which individuals
decide their behavior according to the benefit-to-cost ratio they accrued in the past. We study the onset of
cooperation and synchronization in networked populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how
topology is essential in order for cooperation to thrive. We also display how different classes of topology
foster synchronization differently both at microscopic and macroscopic levels.
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The simultaneous occurrence of events known as
synchronization constitutes one of the most fascinating
phenomenon ever studied. Synchronization has, in fact,
been observed in systems of different nature, from power
grids to biological and chemical environments, just to
name a few [1–4]. If the system is composed of many
units, the pattern of interactions among them plays a
cornerstone role in the establishment of the conditions
under which the onset of synchronization occurs [5,6].
Initially, scientists have studied such onset by encoding
interactions as either a mean-field or a regular lattice [1,4].
However, interactions in real systems are better described
as complex networks [7], and therefore, it is important
to pursue the study of synchronization within such a
paradigm [5].
Despite the abundance of studies regarding the emer-
gence of synchronization in networked populations of
dynamical units, a key aspect has been neglected thus
far: the existence of a cost associated with the interactions
responsible for the update of the state of each dynamical
unit. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that the introduc-
tion of a cost affects the dynamics. With the present Letter,
we sought to highlight what happens to the synchronization
phenomena when interactions between individuals are
regulated by an evolutionary noncooperative game. More
specifically, we are interested in studying the emergence of
synchronization in systems where agents can decide
whether to interact—or not—with their neighbors by
evaluating the cost sustained to alter their own state and
the benefit received by getting more synchronized with the
rest of the neighborhood. Decision processes based on the
evaluation of a payoff constitute the heart of evolutionary
game theory [8,9]. Thus, a coevolutionary approach based
on synchronization and evolutionary game theory is the
natural frame set for studying this kind of problem. We are
interested in assessing under which conditions the will of
getting synchronized (i.e., cooperating) affects the attain-
ment of a global synchronized state. In addition, since the
topology of interactions plays a role of paramount impor-
tance for the onset of a collective behavior [5,10,11], we
also want to study the nexus between different topologies
and the thriving of cooperation and synchronization.
In the proposed model, we study the emergence of
synchronization and cooperation in networked populations
of coupled Kuramoto oscillators [6,12–14]. Each node
corresponds to a different agent or oscillator called to face a
dilemma, named the evolutionary Kuramoto Dilemma,
whenever it must decide the strategy to adopt in the future.
As we will show, the structure of interactions dramatically
affects the conditions under which cooperation and syn-
chronization thrive. Specifically, we observe the onset of a
new transition from the synchronized to incoherent state
when either the coupling strength or the relative cost
becomes too elevated. Moreover, the location of the
transition nontrivially depends on the topology of the
interaction structure.
Let us consider a graph GðN; hkiÞ of N nodes and
average degree hki. Each node, l, represents a dynamical
unit, and its state is characterized by its strategy sl, phase θl,
and natural frequency ωl. The strategy is equal to sl ¼ 1
(sl ¼ 0) if the agent is a cooperator (defector) and shapes
the interaction pattern of the agent. The evolution of the
phase is governed by a slightly modified version of the
Kuramoto model [12–14] given by
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_θl ¼ ωl þ sl λ
XN
j¼1
alj sinðθl − θjÞ; ð1Þ
where λ is the coupling strength, and alj are the elements of
the adjacency matrix A of G. Initially, both θ and ω are
uniformly distributed over the interval [−π, π]. To gauge
the global synchronization level of the system, we use the
Kuramoto order parameter rG [12,13], given by
rG eiΨ ¼
1
N
XN
j¼1
eiθj with rG ∈ ½0; 1; ð2Þ
where i is the imaginary unit and Ψ is the average phase
of the system. When rG ¼ 0, the system is in the incohe-
rent state where all the oscillators have distinct phases.
Conversely, rG ¼ 1 denotes a fully coherent (i.e.,
synchronized) state where all the oscillators have the same
phase. Apart from the global order parameter, it is possible
to define a local measure, rl, which only accounts for the
level of synchronization of a given node with respect to its
neighbors. This, in turn, stems from the general case of
Eq. (2), which, for a pair of nodes l and m, is
rlm eiðθlþθmÞ=2 ¼
eiθl þ eiθm
2
: ð3Þ
Hence, for a node l, the local order parameter, rl, is
rl ¼
P
N
m¼1 almrlmP
N
m¼1 alm
; ð4Þ
Consequently, we can define its average over all the nodes
as rL ¼ ð1=NÞ
P
lrl.
The evolution of the strategy of a given node or player l
depends on the evaluation of the payoff accumulated during
one discrete step of synchronization dynamics. The payoff
is given by the difference between the benefit bl and the
cost cl that the player attains. The former accounts for how
much an oscillator has converged towards being synchron-
ized with its neighbors and is equal to the local order
parameter rl, given by Eq. (4). The latter is given by the
absolute value of the angular acceleration, i.e.,
cl ¼ Δ _θl ≡ j _θlðtÞ − _θlðt − ϵÞj; ð5Þ
where ϵ ¼ 0.01 is the discrete step used to compute the
synchronization dynamics given by Eq. (1) with the Runge-
Kutta method. The absolute value is required to ensure that
cl is always semidefinite positive. Finally, the payoff of a
node is defined as
Πl ¼ rl − α
cl
2π
: ð6Þ
Here, the cost has been divided by 2π to make it commen-
surable with the benefit. Furthermore, we modulate the role
of the cost by multiplying it for a scalar α named relative
cost. The payoff function is designed in a way such that the
benefit complies with the assumption that nodes with
larger degrees could accumulate a higher payoff and, also,
that low levels of synchronization may lead to negative
payoffs. Once the players accumulate their payoffs, they
decide the strategy to adopt in the next time step by means
of the so-called Fermi rule [9,11,15]. In such a rule, the
focal player l randomly selects one of its neighbors,m, and
adopts its strategy with a probability given by
Pðsl ← smÞ ¼
1
1þ e−βðΠm−ΠlÞ ; ð7Þ
where β accounts for the “irrationality” of the players.
Without loss of generality, we use β ¼ 1 throughout this
Letter.We also point out that our results are qualitatively in
agreement with those using other update rules [11], see
Supplemental Material (SM), Sec. VI [16]. We consider
networks with N ¼ 1000 and hki ¼ 6. As an initial
condition, we set half of the population made of cooper-
ators. After each synchronization step, agents accumulate
their payoffs and synchronously update their strategies
according to Eq. (7).We repeat these steps until the system
reaches the stationary state.
To summarize, a cooperator always accepts to interact
with its neighbors trying to reach mutual synchronization
by paying the cost associated with such interactions.
A defector, instead, refuses to interact with its neighbors
and does not pay any cost. Given this scenario, we can
consider a well-mixed population initially composed of
(N − 1) cooperators plus a single defector. From an evolu-
tionary point of view, the defector is highly advantaged
obtaining, on average, the same benefit of all other
members (getting synchronized) without incurring any
cost. Thus, the defector has a payoff always greater than
a cooperator, despite the fact that cooperating would imply
a higher benefit for the entire population. Hence, the system
evolutionarily undergoes a transition to complete defection,
which, in the jargon of evolutionary game theory, is called
the tragedy of the commons [8,17].
As we have seen, the well-mixed scenario leads to the
emergence of a complete non-cooperative and incoherent
state. On the other hand, it has been reckoned that the
structure of interactions is one of the mechanisms fostering
the emergence of both cooperation and synchronization
[18,19]. In light of that, we sought whether networked
interactions might overcome the temptation to defect and,
in turn, lead to the emergence of a coherent state. Therefore,
it is interesting to study under which circumstances
networked populations allow synchronization to thrive.
To explore such a scenario, we choose three different
network topologies, namely, Erdős-Rényi (ER) random
graphs, random geometric graphs (RGG), and Barabási-
Albert (BA) scale-free networks [7,20–22].
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We begin the study of our toy model by looking at its
global behavior. In Fig. 1, we display both the average level
of cooperation, hCi (top), and the global order parameter,
hrGi (bottom), as a function of the relative cost α and
coupling strength λ. At first glance, we notice a strong
correlation between the onset of cooperation and synchro-
nization due to the intertwining among these dynamics. For
example, for low and intermediate values of α, the system
displays a transition from an incoherent state to a fully
coherent one when the coupling exceeds a critical value.
It is worth mentioning that such a transition takes place
at couplings slightly above the expected ones given by
λtheorc ¼ λMFc ðhki=hk2iÞ, where λMFc is the critical value of
the coupling in the mean field (MF) case [18]. For each
topology, we display λtheorc as a horizontal dashed line. For
low relative costs, as the coupling increases, we observe the
appearance of a second spontaneous transition from a
coherent state to an incoherent one. The reason behind
such a loss of synchronization is the increasing burden
associated with the variation of the angular speed, i.e., the
cost, with respect to the benefit associated to the increase of
synchronization. Such a transition is observed exclusively
for small to intermediate values of α and the region where
synchronization takes place shrinks as α increases.
Ultimately, for high values of α, synchronization never
occurs independently of the coupling strength and of the
considered topology. In the case of homogeneous net-
works, following the method introduced by Ohtsuki et al.
[23] (see SM, Sec. II [16]), we can analytically perimeter
the region of the parameter space inside which a single
defector is able to invade a population of cooperators.
Such a region is delimited by the curved dashed line in the
ER and RGG panels. In analogy with other studies on
coevolutionary dynamics [24], the results shown in Fig. 1 tell
us that BA networks do not promote synchronization and
cooperation more than ER random graphs; in spite of what
was reported previously for each dynamics [5,18,25,26].Yet,
RGG panels point towards the existence of additional
mechanisms associated with spatial correlations and the
presence of community structure in order to converge to
more cooperative outcomes (see SM, Sec. IV [16]).
To shed light on such a discrepancy, in Fig. 2, we present
a microscopic analysis by measuring hrLikσ for different
connectivity classes, kσ , and for three scenarios of relative
cost. More precisely, we consider the following cases:
α ¼ 10−3, 10−1.4, 1.0, to account for cheap, intermediate,
and expensive interactions, respectively. Darker solid lines
account for low degree nodes while brighter lines account
for highly connected ones. The vertical dashed lines delimit
the region where synchronization theoretically emerges
(dark red) and vanishes (cyan). The horizontal line, instead,
accounts for the analytical value that rL assumes when two
nodes are randomly selected in a well-mixed population
(see SM, Sec. I [16]) accounting for a scenario where no
synchronization is observed. A closer inspection to Fig. 2
reveals a set of intriguing features. The first is that in BA
networks—and also, to a large extent, in ER ones—nodes
tend to attain synchronization all together, in accordance
with [18], but then they lose it in a hierarchical order,
instead. This is not the case for the RGG where a hierarchy
exists in both transitions, whose quantitative analysis
deserves further investigation. Moreover, there is a value
of λ for which the hierarchy gets inverted, meaning that
nodes placed at the core of communities tend to act as
condensation nuclei exerting a positive feedback for the
formation of cooperative clusters, but are also burdened
FIG. 1. Emergence of cooperation and synchronization at global scale. The top (bottom) row illustrates the average level of
cooperation (synchronization) hCi (hrGi) as a function of the coupling λ and relative cost α. Each column corresponds to a different
topology, namely, ER, RGG, and BA. Results are averages over 50 different realizations.
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with higher costs and, therefore, lose synchronization sooner
(see SM, Sec. IV [16]). The loss of synchronization is
particularly strong in BA networks and is usually accom-
paniedby a dropof rL below the averagevalue in the low-cost
interaction regime. The intermediate-cost regime presents a
similar picture, but the second transition shrinks. Finally, in
the high-cost regime, we also observe the complete absence
of synchronization at a local level. The average cooperation
level essentially follows the same trend of the local synchro-
nization (see SM, Sec. III [16]). We also performed simu-
lations to test the robustness of our results for different initial
conditions, letting the system synchronize for τ steps before
starting the coevolutionary process, and a higher initial
fraction of cooperators (see SM, Sec. V [16]).
In conclusion, by accounting for the existence of a cost
associated with synchronization interactions, we have built a
coevolutionary toy model based on the intertwining of
synchronization and evolutionary game theory. The resulting
dilemma has been named the evolutionary Kuramoto
Dilemma. Network reciprocity has proven itself as a valuable
catalyzer of both the survival of cooperation and synchro-
nization, and the effects of accounting for the cost of
interaction in networked populations are twofold. On one
hand, high values of the coupling result in the desynchro-
nization of the system, which has been previously observed
only in higher-order models such as the Rössler model [27].
The other result is the appearance of a hierarchy in the degree
of nodes attaining or losing synchronization, which depends
on the topology in a nontrivial manner. Our numerical results
have been performed for a relatively small system size,
although analogous chimera states can also emerge on larger
RGG and lattice topologies [28,29]. Considering more
realistic patterns, like spatial proximity and heterogeneous
ones, sheds some light on suchdependence andpaves theway
to further investigations. Finally, the model presented here—
apart from looking at synchronization under a different
perspective—can be used to tackle a wide range of problems,
leveraging the interplay among coupling, cost, and topology
to drive the system towards a coherent or incoherent state. For
example, the relation between cooperation and synchroniza-
tion has been explored in the context of social, cognitive, and
behavioral sciences. In the former, previous studies pointed at
assessing whether the execution of coordinated or synchron-
ized actionsmay foster the onset of cooperation (military drills
are an example of such situations) [30–32]. In the latter,
instead, studies aimed at understanding the individual’s
FIG. 2. Emergence of cooperation and synchronization at microscopic scale. Each plot displays the average local Kuramoto para-
meter for different degree classes hrLikσ as a function of the coupling λ and for the three studied topologies (ER, RGG, BA). Colors refer
to different degree classes: kσ ∈ fk1;…; k4 ⇔ ½1; 3; ½4; 7; ½8; 10; ½11;∞g for both ER and RGG, and kσ ∈ fk1;…; k7 ⇔
½1; 5; ½6; 10; ½11; 20; ½21; 40; ½41; 55; ½56; 80; ½81;∞g for BA. Each row corresponds to a different value of α: top row,
α ¼ 10−3, middle row, α ¼ 10−1.4, and bottom row, α ¼ 1.0. Results are averages over 50 different realizations.
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behavioral plasticity—i.e., the will of individuals to disregard
their individual preferences—could be altered to improve the
synchronization [33–37].An evenmore appealing application
is represented by the so-called “social insects” (ants, bees,
fireflies, etc.) whose synchronized (or not) behavior—i.e., the
flashing of fireflies and the Leptothorax acervorum ants
activity cycle to cite a few—can be explained in terms of
natural selection [38–42]. Last, a modified version of the
Kuramotomodel has also been used to study the attainment of
consensus in opinion dynamics [43–45].
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